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Homosexuality and the European
Convention on Human Rights:
What Rights?
By Daniel J. Kane
Member of the Class of 1988

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982 the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom (Dudgeon 11)1 that member states of the Council of Europe that criminalized adult consensual homosexual acts violated the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).2 Numerous cases
have been brought, both before and after Dudgeon II, challenging various
criminalizations and acts of state stigmatization of homosexuality. These
cases, however, have not established breaches under the Convention.
The various cases challenging member states laws regarding homosexuality have incongruous rulings. In the thirty years since the first case
challenged the criminalization of homosexuality,' the bodies empowered
to hear complaints under the Convention have refused to hear all but two
cases. Of the two cases heard, one was Dudgeon I. The other was a
decision reinforcing the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral
and therefore subject to limited state regulation through criminal laws.4
The Dudgeon II ruling was a laudable step forward in the recognition of human rights. It does not provide, however, the necessary framework on which the natural and proper extension of those human rights
1. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).

2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention came into force on Sept. 3,
1953, after 10 nations had ratified it. The first ten signatories were the United Kingdom,
Norway, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, Malta, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxembourg. Subsequently, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Cyprus,
France, and Switzerland ratified the Convention. See A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN R GHTS IN
EUROPE 310 (1977).
3. Application No. 104/55, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Case-Law Topics 29 (1973).

4. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 66
(1980); Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
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can be built. The Dudgeon I1 Court based its ruling on the Convention's

right of privacy. This premise is fundamentally flawed as a tool for
achieving the Convention's goal of the "further realisation [sic] of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"' with regards to homosex-

ual persons. 6 This flaw in the rationale underlying Dudgeon II, whether
accidental or intentional, is because of the Court's sole reliance on the

right of privacy. This right of privacy, however, is not the means through
which homosexual persons can achieve true equality under the law. The
right of privacy premise does not call into question, and may even give

subtle credence to, the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral.
As long as homosexuality is seen as immoral, homosexual persons will
not be accorded the basic human dignity due them. Their human rights
will continue to be denied.7

First this Note will discuss the case law relating to homosexuality
under the Convention. Next, it will show that the notion that homosexuality is immoral, a basic assumption in the case law, is inimical to achieving recognition of the human rights of homosexual persons. Third, this

Note will illustrate how the right of privacy rationale reinforces the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral. Finally, this Note will
draw upon both the basic theories of democracy underlying the Convention and the findings of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe to recommend that sexual self-determination be established as a

fundamental freedom. If sexual self-determination were a fundamental
freedom, homosexual persons would be accorded the basic human rights
guaranteed in the Convention.

II. THE CONVENTION
The Convention was a Western European response to the horrors of
5. Convention, supra note 2, at 222.
6. This Note will consistently refer to "homosexual persons" as those people whose legal
and social position is determined by the laws regulating homosexuality. In the United States,
the term "homosexual" is often perceived as derogatory and homosexual persons prefer the
terms "gay" and "lesbian." The European legal materials, however, do not utilize these terms.
Thus, the use of the terms "gay" and "lesbian" in analyzing European law on the subject
would be inappropriate. The word "persons" is used in conjunction with "homosexual" because homosexual persons should not be referred to merely as "homosexuals," which would
define them exclusively by their sexual orientation. Homosexual persons are just that; foremost they are individual persons, who can then be amorphously classified by their sexual orientation for this legal analysis.
7. See, e-g., Case ofX, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 66, infra notes 217-29
and accompanying text.
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Nazism.8 Many of the delegates to the Convention acted out of a desire
to protect the rights and freedoms already enjoyed in their countries
from the threat of future totalitarianism. 9 The Convention has, however,
long since transcended its original purpose and now serves to protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms as measured by contemporary
attitudes. 0 This purpose is most evident in the rulings of modem cases
under the Convention that do not necessarily depend on the original intentions of the Convention's authors. II Furthermore, neither the courts
12
nor the Commission is bound by precedent in reaching their decisions.
The Convention establishes an elaborate enforcement mechanism to
address complaints of alleged violations of the Convention's principles. 3
Article 25 of the Convention creates the right of individual petition. It is
under this provision that all individual cases challenging the regulation
of homosexuality arise. The Convention recognizes this right of petition
since individuals are the real parties in interest regarding this international guarantee of human rights. 4 Individuals who can establish that
they are a "victim" of an alleged breach of the rights guaranteed under
the Convention may seek redress through Article 25.11
A.

The Application Process

Applications alleging violations of the Convention go first to the European Commission of Human Rights [hereinafter the Commission].' 6
The Commission screens the applications to determine whether they
meet the complex procedural requirements under Articles 25 through
8. Doswald-Beck, The Meaning of the "Right to Respect for PrivateLife" Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 HuM. RTs. LJ. 283, 287 (1983).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 285.
13. The principle rights guaranteed in the Convention are contained in Articles I through
13. These rights include the following: a member state's general obligation to abide by the
Convention; the right to life; freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment; freedom from
slavery or servitude; the right to liberty and security; the right to a fair trial; protection against
retroactivity in the criminal law; the right of privacy; freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; freedom of expression and information; freedom of assembly and association; the
right to marry and found a family; and the right to an effective remedy before a national
authority. See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 294-98.
14. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 149.

15. The "victim" requirement means that an individual has the right to petition under the
Convention when she has actually been harmed by the alleged breach. This requirement is
similar to the standing requirement for constitutional challenges in the United States court
systems. The right of individual petition has been accepted by 13 signatories to the Convention. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 151.
16. F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14-16 (1974).
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27. 17 The Commission then determines if the alleged breach is within the
scope of the Convention.'" By making this determination, the Commission plays a significant role in reaching decisions on the merits of each
application. 9 In certain instances, the Commission refers cases to the
European Court on Human Rights [hereinafter the Court]. 20 The Court
is the ultimate arbiter of disputes and renders the final and most binding
interpretations of the Convention. 2 1
In determining the justiciability of individual applications, the Commission screens all the applications and rules as to the admissibility of
each application.22 The "admissibility" function serves to filter the glut
of applications that inevitably arises from an individual and free application process. 23 The Commission has relied on this filtering process to
screen out all but two applications challenging various aspects of the
criminalization of homosexuality. 24 Even though the Commission has
given full consideration to only two cases, it has rendered quasi-substantive opinions in most of the subject applications. These opinions constitute case law of a sort since the Commission ruled them inadmissible as
"manifestly ill-founded." In determining whether an application is
"manifestly ill-founded," the Commission ascertains whether or not it,
on the facts presented, states aprimafacieviolation of the Convention. 2
Additionally, the Commission and the parties often in subsequent cases
26
cite to these rulings on admissibility in their reports and arguments.
There are two articles of the Convention that are most pertinent to
this discussion.2 7 Article 8 states that "[e]veryone has the right to re17. Id. Article 26 generally requires that the applicant exhaust all effective domestic remedies and that she file the application within six months of the date of the final domestic
decision in her case. Id. at 40-53. Article 27 sets out five further conditions which mandate a
ruling of inadmissibility. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 159. Hence, Articles 26 and 27
establish "seven hurdles which the applicant has to jump" before an application will be
deemed admissible. Id.,
18. F. CASrBERG, supra note 16, at 14-16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22.

F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RiciIs 218-19 (1975).

23. Id.
24. Id.; See, e.g., supra note 4.
25. F. JACOBS, supra note 22, at 243-46.

26. See, eg., Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions &
Reports 66 (1980); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
27. Some applications have invoked Article 3, which prohibils inhuman or degrading
treatment, and Article 10 which guarantees free expression. See, e.g., Application No. 530/59,
1960 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 184; Case of X, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions &
Reports 66.
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spect for his private.., life. ' 28 This right to privacy is qualified, however, by paragraph 2 which permits interference by state authorities
when the measure: (1) is in accordance with the law, (2) is necessary in a
democratic society, and (3) serves to protect specific enumerated interests
of the state, such as the protection of health or morals or the protection
of the rights of others.2 9 Article 14 states in part that "[tihe enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
30
without discrimination on any ground such as sex.., or other status."
Article 14 holds the most promise for achieving equal treatment under
the law for homosexual persons.
B.

Early Convention Case Law

The first application challenging the criminalization of homosexual
relations was lodged by a German citizen against the Federal Republic of
Germany. 3 ' The applicant challenged Article 175 of the German Penal
Code under which he had been convicted for homosexual offenses. 32 He
challenged the criminal provision as a violation of Articles 8 and 14 of
the Convention in that the law banned only male homosexual acts and
not female homosexual acts. 33 Application 104/55 was declared inadmissible by the Commission on December 17, 1955.
The Commission found that the criminal provision was justified
under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as necessary in a democratic society "for
the protection of health or morals."' 35 Additionally, the Commission
held that treating male and female homosexuals differently did not violate Article 14 since it was reasonably calculated to protect health or
morals.36
Over the next twenty years, the Commission ruled inadmissible as
"manifestly ill-founded" several additional applications challenging
either the German ban on male homosexual relations and convictions
under that law, or harsh sentences imposed subsequent to those convictions.37 The Commission acknowledged in all cases that the criminal
proscription was an interference with the right of privacy. However, it
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Convention, supra note 2, at 230.
Id.
Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
Application No. 104/55, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Case-Law Topics 29-30 (1973).
Id.
Id.

34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 3 DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CAsE-LAW RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
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justified the interference as necessary for the protection of health or
morals.3 8

Despite very challenging arguments that the German Penal Code
provision violated the Convention, the Commission consistently ruled
the applications inadmissible on one ground or another. Thus, the Commission did not need to respond to the specific arguments raised by each
application.39
For example, in Application 530/59 a German court sentenced the
applicant to preventive custody of an indefinite duration for repeated violations of the German Penal Code provision banning homosexual relations. 4" The applicant challenged both the sentence and the law itself as
violations of the Convention's Article 3 prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment.4" The Commission held that the application was
filed beyond the six month time limit prescribed for individual petitions,
despite the fact that the applicant had lodged h:is appeal within six
months prior to the filing of the application.42 The Commission focused
on the prior convictions which had occurred beyond the six month time
period.4 3 Even though the Commission relied on procedural grounds to
rule the application inadmissible, it reiterated the firmly established rule
that homosexual relations could be proscribed by criminal sanctions
4
under Article 8.
In Application 704/60, the applicant had written a letter to the German Penal Law Commission requesting that the criminal prohibition on
all homosexual relations be abolished because "homosexuality is an inherent factor in the personality of certain individual; for which they cannot be blamed or punished."45 The applicant included an extract from a
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 308 (1984) [hereinafter STASBOURG CASE-LAW];
1307/61, 1962 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RT. 230.

Application No,

38. STRASBOURG CASE-LAw, supra note 37, at 308. Although all of these applications
challenged the same provision of the German Penal Code, Germany was not the only member
state that criminalized homosexual relations during this time. See, e.g., Application No. 530/
59, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RT. 184; Application No. 704/60, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
1 (1960). Germany did, however, enforce the most severe punishments under its penal code.
F. CASTBERG, supra note 16, at 145.

39. See, e.g., Application No. 530/59, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 184; Applt.
cation No. 704/60, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1.
40. Application No. 530/59, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 188.
41. Id. at 188-89.
42. Id. at 192-93.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 193.
45. Application No. 704/60, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1,4-5 (1960). Charged with fraud and
homosexual offenses, the applicant had been sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and subsequent preventive custody. Id. at 3.
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medical textbook to substantiate his request." s The Commission avoided
this difficult issue by stating that "[i]t does not appear clearly whether
the Applicant raises this question before the Commission."'47 The Commission did, however, again reiterate its firm conviction that the German
Penal Code provision interfered with the Article 8 right of privacy.4 8 But
because this interference was justified in the interest of health and
morals, it was therefore a legitimate interference with the right of privacy
under paragraph 2 of Article 8."
In 1962 the Commission ruled inadmissible an application that
sought the Commission's support to have the applicant's criminal record
expunged of a conviction for homosexual relations. 50 The German
courts ruled the conviction invalid because it had been obtained beyond
the applicable statute of limitations.5 1 The German courts did however
uphold the local authorities' maintenance of criminal files including photographs and fingerprints of the applicant. 52 The Commission found no
violation of the Convention by the maintenance of these records. The
Commission cited the German courts' rulings that the records were necessary for the prevention of crime, particularly homosexual relations
53
which is a crime with a high rate of recidivism.
The applicant was an attorney who had been disbarred following his
conviction.5 4 He sought reinstatement on the grounds that the conviction was invalid and that this measure constituted a violation of the Convention's Article 3 prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment."1
The Commission refused to accede to his request for reinstatement and
failed to fully address the alleged violation of the ban on inhuman or
degrading punishment.5 6 Instead, it relied upon the firmly established
rule that punishment of homosexual relations did not violate the
57
Convention.
In 1975, the Commission reached a significant turning point in its
evaluation of individual petitions challenging the criminal regulation of
46. Id. at 4-5.

47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 7.

49. Id.
50. Application No. 1307/61, 1962 Y.B. EUR.CONy. ON HUM. RTrs. 230.

51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 232-34.
54. Id. at 230.
55. Id.

56. See id. at 234.
57. Id.
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homosexuality." For the first time, the Commission sought the input of
the respondent government in determining the admissibility of an application alleging a violation of the Convention by the criminalization of
homosexual relations. Application 5935/72 challenged the recently
amended German Penal Code's prohibition of homosexual relations between a male over the age of 18 and one under the age of 21.1 9 The
German Penal Code was amended in 1969 to otherwise decriminalize
male homosexuality between consenting adults.' ° The German government, however, retained the legal dichotomy of regulating male homosexuality without regulating lesbianism.61 The applicant alleged that the
law violated the Convention's Article 8 right of privacy by proscribing
male homosexual relations between males under the age of 21, and also
the Article 14 prohibition of gender discrimination.62
In seeking the German government's input on the alleged violations,
the Commission stated the issue as: "On the assumption that the legislation punishing masculine homosexuality is compatible with the provisions of Article 8 (2) as a measure necessary in a democratic society for
the protection of the rights of others, is it not nevertheless contrary to
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8?" 63 The German government responded that the differential treatment based on gender was not
arbitrary because the deterrent effect served by the criminal sanctions
applied to male homosexuals was not necessary for lesbians. 64 In support
of its position, the government submitted that "young men are much
more exposed to the risk of homosexual relations with adults than
girls." 6 The government then adduced a flurry of age-old stereotypical
notions to substantiate the law: there are few lesbians as compared to
male homosexuals; lesbians are more stable because they seek partners
their own age and remain longer in relationships with partners; male
homosexuals prey upon the young and frequently change partners; and
the exhibitionism of male homosexual couples threatens to expose adolescents to social isolation and conflicts with society.66
In declaring the Application 5935/72 inadmissible, the Commission

held that the impugned law was necessary in a democratic society for the
58. Application 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 46 (1975).
59. Id.

60. Id. at 54.
61. Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
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protection of the fights of others.6 7 The law operated "to prevent homosexual acts with adults having an unfortunate influence on the development of heterosexual tendencies in minors. ' 68 The Commission noted
further that "on account of the social reprobation with which homosexuality is still frequently regarded a minor involved in homosexual relationships with an adult might in fact be cut off from society and seriously
affected in his psychological development., 69 Ironically, the Commission ruled that the law was designed to enable adolescents to "achieve
true autonomy in sexual matters. 70
On the issue of gender discrimination, the Commission found the
differential treatment justified because the German authorities limited
the invasion of privacy affected by the law solely to the group posing the
greatest threat to adolescents-male homosexuals. 7 ' The Commission
accepted the government's assertions that lesbianism was very limited,
more stable, less prone to the proselytization of adolescents, and generally less harmful to society. 2
Application 5935/72 heralded the beginning of a new era in the
Commission's consideration of homosexuality. The Commission made
its landmark decision that "[a] person's sexual life is undoubtedly part of
his private life of which it constitutes an important aspect.""' The importance of this case is exemplified by the fact that both the parties and
the Commission have relied heavily on the basic notions underlying this
decision in subsequent cases. Interestingly, this decision also foreshadowed the future direction of the Commission's decision making process
regarding the criminalization of homosexuality: superficial acceptance of
respondent governments' stereotypical rationales underlying the challenged criminal laws.
C. The Case of X 7 4
In 1978 the Commission first declared admissible an individual application challenging the criminalization of homosexual relations." In
the Case of X, the applicant challenged British law criminalizing consensual homosexual acts between one male over the age of 21 and one under
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.

72. Id. at 55-56.

73. Id. at 54.
74. Application No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 66, 68 (1980).
75. Id.
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the age of 21. His challenge rested on three points: a violation of the
Article 8 right of privacy because he was prosecuted and sentenced to
imprisonment for private sexual behavior; a violation of the Article 14
prohibition on discrimination in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms
under the Convention because heterosexuals and female homosexuals are
legally permitted sexual relations at the age of 16; and a violation of the
Article 10 right of free expression because while in prison the applicant
was denied the ability to express his feelings of love to other men.76
In 1974 the applicant had been convicted, at age 26, and sentenced
to two and one-half years in prison.7 7 The British court convicted the

applicant of two counts of buggery with two males aged eighteen.78 The
applicant argued that the majority of European countries recognizes ages
of consent as eighteen or lower for homosexual relations." Therefore,
prohibition of homosexual relations between adults (those aged 18 to 21)
could not be sustained as necessary in a democratic society.80 Additionally, he cited numerous medical and professional studies which indicated
that homosexuality is not a disease and that exposure to homosexual relationships can be "of positive help to the young person with homosexual
tendencies in so far as they might reduce or even eliminate sensations of
stress and frustration."81 In his Article 14 challenge, the applicant urged
that the government could not sustain its burden of proving that the disparity in the regulation of heterosexual and lesbian sex between persons
18 to 21 (none) and male homosexuals was "a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be
realised [sic]."82
The government acknowledged that the law did affect an interference with the right of privacy but this interference was necessary to protect males in the 18 to 21 year old age group "from the attentions and
pressures of an undesirable kind." 3 The government noted that sixteen
states in the Council of Europe had laws regulating homosexual activity
in one form or another and accordingly, laws of this sort are indeed nec76. Id.
77. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. I (1980).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 22. This burden of proof, placed upon governments whose laws have been
challenged as unjustifiably discriminatory under Article 14, was established in an earlier case
brought before the Court. Id.
83. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 25-26 (1980).
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essary in a democratic society. 84 The government quoted extensively
from the Commission's decision in Application 5935/72.8 5
The government argued that a young man "involved in homosexual
relationships with an adult might in fact be cut off from society and seriously affected in his psychological development."8 6 The government also
argued that "masculine homosexuals often constitute a distinct socio-cultural group with a clear tendency to proselytise adolescents and that the
social isolation in which it involves the latter is particularly marked."8 7
Following the lead of the German government, the British government
urged that the law was "clearly inspired by the need to protect the rights
of children and adolescents and enable them to attain true autonomy in
sexual matters."8 8
The Commission defined the issue as whether the criminal prosecution in this case could be justified as a warranted intrusion into the applicant's privacy. 9 Hence, the inquiry was directed to whether the
interference met the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2. Namely, was
it in accordance with the law, made for the purposes of protecting health
or morals or the rights of others, and was it necessary in a democratic
society.9" Clearly the interference was in accordance with the law since
it was a provision of that law."' Based on the particular facts of this case,
the Commission ruled that the prosecution was justified as a protection
of the rights of others (a basis on which most sexual offenses are premised).9 2 Finally, the Commission held that the law was necessary in a
democratic society because, like all criminal laws, it "provide[s] safeguards in order to protect individuals from harm, particularly those who
are specially vulnerable because of their age."93 By a divided vote, the
Commission found no violation of Article 8 because the law was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others. 94
In making its determination, the Commission noted that there had
been "a constant evolution of opinion"9 5 regarding the regulation of ho84. ld at 29.
85. Application No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 46, 54-56

(1975).
86.
87.
88.
89.

Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 30, 35 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 39.

90. Id. at 40.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

41.
42.
46.
44.
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mosexual acts. The Commission also noted that each law "must be examined on its own merits and in the context of the society for which it is
considered appropriate." 9 6 Furthermore, it found that "the current
trends throughout Europe in relation to private consensual homosexual
behaviour [sic] tend to emphasise [sic] tolerance and understanding as
opposed to the use of criminal sanctions." 9 7 The Commission took great
heed of the fact that despite these trends, proposals to lower the age of
consent had been rejected by the British Parliament." The Commission
held that because the law was justified as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others under paragraph 2 of Article
8, it need not consider whether the law was necessary or justified for the
protection of morals.99 Ostensibly then, the Commission did not make a
value judgment as to the morality of homosexuality in reaching its decision under the Article 8 challenge.
Without even considering the Article 14 violation, the Commission
held that because the law was justified under Article 8 paragraph 2, it
was also justified under Article 14. °° The Commission relied on its finding in Application 5935/72 to uphold the disparity in treatment between
male and female homosexuals based on the idea that male homosexuals
pose a greater threat to adolescents and society than female
homosexuals. 1o
The Commission summarily rejected the Article 10 freedom of expression complaint, stating that the freedom of expression guaranteed in
the Convention relates solely to the expression of ideas and opinions. 10 2
Hence, the complainant's deprivation of freedom to express his love for
men while imprisoned did not 3constitute a deprivation of rights under
0
Article 10 of the Convention.1
The significance of the Case of X lies not so much in its ultimate
decision, as in the rationale underlying that decision and the fact that the
application itself was ruled admissible. The Com:mission's opinion reflects a more sympathetic approach towards individual challenges to the
criminalization of homosexuality. In addition, the opinion recognizes
that long held beliefs about homosexuality are changing. It acknowledges the problematic nature of resting challenges to the criminalization
96. Id.
97. Id. at 45.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 46.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 47-48.
102. Id. at 48-49.
103. Id.
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of homosexuality on the right of privacy." Thus the opinion presages
what was to come in the Dudgeon II case. The Commission, purporting
to avoid any decision on the morality of homosexuality, actually relies on
the notion that homosexuality is harmful, and thus immoral, in reaching
its decision.
D. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom'
The first and only case challenging the criminalization of homosexual relations to reach the Court is the Dudgeon II case." After declaring the application admissible and finding a violation of the Article 8
right of privacy, the Commission referred the case to the Court."0 7 The
applicant challenged three criminal provisions in Northern Ireland carrying severe penalties for homosexual acts, including one which provided
for life imprisonment. 0 8 The provisions operated to criminalize all male
homosexual relations. Dudgeon challenged the laws on the basis of:
1) an Article 8 violation of the right to respect for private life; 2) an
Article 8 paragraph 2 violation as not necessary for the protection of
morals or the rights of others; and 3) an Article 14 violation of the prohibition against gender, national origin, and place of residence discrimination because male homosexuals in England, Wales, and Scotland were
not regulated by such laws and female homosexuals were not subject to
such criminal sanctions. 10 9
The Commission declared the application admissible and sought
submissions from the parties as to their positions on the alleged violations of the Convention.Y0 The Commission proceeded to find that the
existence of the laws in question, regarding private consensual homosexual relations between adults, was a breach of the Article 8 right of pri104. Id. at 49a (separate opinion of Mr. Opsahl). Mr. Opsahl noted the difficulty ofjudging this type of case under the right of privacy rationale. Id. The challenged law involved
relations between two people but the right of privacy encompasses only an individual's freedom. Id. He stated that the applicant's ability to engage in homosexual relations was circumscribed only to the extent that he could legally engage in such relations with partners over the
age of 21. Id. The other party, however, had a stronger claim because he was barred from
such relations altogether. Id. This opinion may hold some promise for a more reflective decision by the Commission on the necessity of "protecting" young males from their own sexuality, should a homosexual person in the proscribed age group challenge such a law.
105. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. CL H.RL (ser. A) (1982).
106. Id.
107. Id at 6.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7525/76, Eur. Comm'n H.RL 26,
(1980) [hereinafter Dudgeon I].
110. Id. at 2.
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vacy.I1 The laws could not be justified as necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of morals.' 12 Relying on its earlier determinations in Application 5935/72 and the Case of X, the Commission found
that the laws applicable to males below the age of 21, did not violate the
Convention." 3 The Commission found it unneccessary to make a determination on Dudgeon's Article 14 discrimination complaint since it had
already ruled that the laws were in breach of Article 8.114
In a separate opinion, one member of the Commission dissented
from the Commission's finding of no violation under Article 14.11" He
advocated protection of homosexual persons under Article 14 stating,
"[s]ince the prohibition of homosexual acts in private is contrary to Art.
8, there cannot be an objective and reasonable justification for the differ11 6
ence in treatment between homosexual and heterosexual persons."
The refusal of the Commission to find an Article 14 violation significantly limited the scope of protection to be given homosexual persons by
the Court in its Dudgeon II decision.
On July 18, 1980, the Commission referred the case to the Court for
its decision on whether the facts disclosed a breach of the Convention
under Article 8, either alone or in conjunction with Article 14.117 In its
first action on the case, the Court ruled unanimously to convene a plenary session of all judges to consider the "serious questions" presented by19
the case. 1 8 Accordingly, a panel of nineteen judges decided the case.
On all of the issues, the Court ruled in substantially the same manner as
the Commission had in its decision.
The Court first considered the proposals for reform of the impugned
laws that the government had recently contemplated but failed to enact.
These proposals had fallen into desuetude after the British government
had sought public opinion on the decriminalization of adult hormosexual
relations. 20 The government had determined that the general popula111. Id. at 36.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 32-36.
114. Id. at 38.
115. Id. at 40 (separate opinion of Mr. Polak).
116. Id.
117. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6.
118. Id. Normally the Court hears cases with a panel of seven judges, however, "[w]here a
case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the
Convention, the Chamber may, at any time, relinquish jurisdiction in favour [sic] of a plenary
court." A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 203 (quoting Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
119. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5.
120. Id.at 14.
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tion of Northern Ireland was evenly divided on the issue.1 21 The more
conservative elements of Northern Irish society were, however, quite vocal in their opposition to any reform. ' 22 Despite the fact that the Church
of Ireland, social agencies, and the Standing Advisory Commission on
Human Rights supported the measure, no individual member of Parliament representing Northern Ireland would introduce the reform as a
proposed bill.123 Hence although the government considered reforming
the law to conform to the law as it stood in the rest of Great Britain at
the time (Le., consensual homosexual relations between males over the
age of 21 generally not subject to criminal sanctions), the reform measure
was never brought before Parliament.
The absolute ban on all male homosexual relations was not lifted.
The government however argued that since 1972, no one in Northern
Ireland had been prosecuted under the law for any act that would not
have been an offense under the prevailing law in the remainder of the
United Kingdom, where homosexual relations between consenting adults
over age 21 are generally not proscribed.12 4 The Court noted, however,
that there was no stated policy not to prosecute alleged violations under
the law and that a policy to prosecute violations that were in the "public
'
interest" did in fact exist. 25
Additionally, these laws provided a means
by which private individuals could initiate prosecutions of alleged violations.1 26 Thus the government could not argue that the laws were without force and not a real basis on which Dudgeon could claim a breach of
the Convention.
The Court agreed with the Commission that the laws constituted a
continuing interference with Dudgeon's right of privacy under the Convention. 2 7 Also the Court noted that Dudgeon was inherently predis1 28
posed to commit the proscribed sexual acts due to his homosexuality.
Hence the laws required him to refrain from any sexual expression at all
12 9
or else become liable to criminal prosecution.
The government advanced two grounds under Article 8 paragraph 2
121. Id.

122. Id. at 13-14.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 14-15.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id. at 14. A private individual may commence a prosecution for homosexual offenses,
subject to the Director of Public Prosecution's power to assume control of the prosecution and
to drop the charges in his discretion. Id.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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to justify the interference. 130 First, the government argued that the laws
protected the moral ethos of Northern Irish society, especially in light of
the vocal opposition who feared that any penal reform would seriously
threaten the moral fabric of that society. 131 Second, the government contended that the laws, as applied to males under the age of 21, were necessary for the protection of the rights of others, namely those in the
proscribed age group.' 32 The Court held that any purported distinction
between these two grounds was "somewhat artificial" in that the "protection"
under the second ground was based on societal notions of morality. 133 The Court did, however, hold that criminal regulation of
homosexuality could be justified on both grounds. 134 The decision then
turned on what bounds the criminal law could operate
within and still be
135
society.
democratic
a
in
necessary
as
considered
In determining the proper bounds within which the criminal proscription of consensual homosexual relations could democratically operate, the Court stated that "the view taken ...

of the requirements of

morals varies from time to time and place to place."' 136 Hence national
authorities were better suited to gauge a particular society's moral requirements.' 37 The Court noted, however, that the impugned laws affected "a most intimate aspect of private life."' 138 Thus, "there must exist
particularly serious reasons before interferences on t:he part of public authorities can be legitimate."' 139 The legitimacy of the interferences is
measured by whether it could be said that they are necessary in a demo140
cratic society characterized by "tolerance and broadmindedness."'
Summarily stated, the interference must be proportionate to a legitimate
aim. 14 1
The Court ruled that the restriction imposed on.Dudgeon, and consenting males over 21, was "by reason of its breadth and absolute character . . . disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved." 142 The
Court determined the aim of the restriction to be the protection of the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. (quoting Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 22 (1976)),
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 24.
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moral ethos of Northern Ireland. 4 3 This aim could not justify the degree of interference imposed on adult male homosexual persons.144 It
noted that the government had refrained from prosecuting the impugned
laws with respect to males over the age of 21.141 Furthermore the moral
standards of Northern Ireland had not suffered, nor had there been a
public outcry for enforcement of the laws.'4 The Court did, however,
give a fair measure of sway to public opinion in ascertaining the legitimacy of intrusive governmental actions taken in the name of protecting
morals. 4 7 Nonetheless, the Court stated that "[a]lthough members of
the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual
acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of
penal sanctions
148
when it is consenting adults alone who are involved."
Regarding the impugned laws as applied to males under the age of
21, the Court ruled that the criminal prohibitions were justified for the
protection of the rights of others. 149 Presumably, based on the Court's
earlier discussion of the interplay between this ground and the protection
of morals, the Court tacitly sanctioned the protection of morals as a legitimate aim of the challenged laws. 15 0 The Court reiterated its prior recognition of the fact that there exists a legitimate necessity for some degree
of control over homosexuality, even in a democratic society."'
The Court, like the Commission before it, declined to rule on Dudgeon's Article 14 discrimination complaint because it perceived that complaint to be essentially the same as the one lodged under Article 8, but
merely "seen from a different angle." 15' 2 The Court did note, however,
that an Article 14 complaint might possibly lie for a homosexual person
who was subject to a law requiring a comparatively high age of consent.' 5 3 Northern Ireland would first have to establish an age of
consent. 154
The Dudgeon II Court clearly stated: "[tlhe Court is not concerned
with making any value-judgment as to the morality of homosexual rela143. IdL
144. Id.

145. Id
146. Id.

147. Id. at 22-23.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

153. Ia
154. Id.

at 24.
at 25 (emphasis added).
at 20-21.
at 25.
at 26.
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tions between adult males." 155
In upholding their criminal prohibition,
the Court did, however, make a value-judgment with respect to homosexual relations involving males under the age of 21. This ruling as to males
under the age of 21 reflects an unequivocal judgment as to the immorality of homosexuality. More importantly the Court did not question the
notion that homosexuality was inherently immoral, nor is there any evidence to substantiate that notion. The Court accepted the premise that
homosexuality could be criminally regulated in some measure for the
protection of societal morals. The Court devoted significant effort to outlining the paramount role of public opinion in measuring those morals.
The plenary Court assembled to decide Dudgeon 11 ruled fifteen to
four in finding a breach of the Article 8 right of privacy. 156 Regardless of
the rationale underlying the decision or its qualifying language, it is certain that member states cannot now impose an absolute ban on all adult
consensual homosexual relations without violating Article 8. The Court
ruled fourteen to five in declining to consider the Article 14 discrimination complaint. 157 Presumably, this clear majority portends a difficult
struggle for those seeking Article 14 discrimination protection for homosexual persons under the Convention.15 Thus the Dudgeon II decision
has limited utility for homosexual persons striving to achieve their
human rights under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The potential for achieving
those rights does exist, however, in the form of two declarations passed
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1981.

E. Parliamentary Declarations of 1981: Sexual Self-Determination
In 1981 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
adopted two resolutions on homosexuality that far exceed the Commission's and Court's decisions recognizing homosexual persons as a legitimate and protected minority group. The Assembly is solely a
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id. at 27.
157. Id.
158. The dissenting opinions are not particularly noteworthy. Three of the five dissents
decried the finding of a breach under Article 8, relying on the notion that homosexuality is
inherently immoral and therefore clearly amenable to any form of criminal proscription. Id. at
29 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zekia); Id. at 33 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Matscher); Id.
at 39 (Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walsh). A fourth dissent argued that Dudgeon
was not a "victim" under the Convention since he had not been prosecuted under the impugned laws. Id. at 38 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinheiro Farinha). Finally, one dissent
argued that the Court erred in not fully considering Dudgeon's Article 14 complaint, thereby
excessively limiting the scope of protection given under Article 14. rd. at 32 (Dissenting Opinion of Judges Evrigenis and Garcia de Enterria).
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deliberative organ which makes recommendations to the Committee of
Ministers.159 The Assembly's recommendations are not binding upon
the Committee of Ministers."
Resolution 756 called upon the World Health Organization to remove homosexuality from the international classification of diseases, noting that "the theory whereby homosexuality, whether male or female, is
a form of mental disturbance has no sound scientific or medical basis,
and has been refuted by recent research."' 61 In formulating its request,
the Assembly reiterated its commitment to fight against all forms of discrimination and oppression.1 62 More significantly, though, it declared
that all individuals, once they had reached the legal age of consent in the
country of their residence, should have the right of sexual self1 63
determination.
Recommendation 924 was addressed to member states of the Council of Europe through the Committee of Ministers, and was far more
comprehensive in cataloging the forms of discrimination against homosexual persons that it sought to abolish."' The Assembly again reiterated its commitment to the abolition of all forms of discrimination and
took note of the fact that homosexual persons "continue to suffer from
discrimination, and even, at times, from oppression."1 6 5- The Assembly
went on to state that, notwithstanding the value of traditional family life,
discrimination against homosexual persons in modern pluralistic societies was motivated by the "survival of several centuries of prejudice."'"
The Assembly reaffirmed sexual self-determination, limited only by the
relevant age of consent. 67 It called upon those few member states that
continued to criminalize homosexual relations to decriminalize them, ac68
knowledging, of course, the state's role in the protection of children.'
Specifically, the Assembly recommended the same age of consent for ho159. A. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 10. Even so, the Assembly has been instrumental in
setting the tone for the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention. It was the
organ that initiated and pressed for the right of individual petition, which is now the cornerstone of the Convention. Id. at 10-16.
160. Id. at 10. As the executive organ of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers decides what action the Council takes to further its aims. Id. The Consultative Assembly,
on the other hand, is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe. The Consultative Assembly's conclusions go to the Committee of Ministers as recommendations. Id.
161. 1981 Y.B. EUR.CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 82.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 2 EoR. CoNv. oN HUM. RTS., TExTs & DocuMmars 136-38 (1984).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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mosexual personS as for heterosexuals, the abolition of any special
records regarding homosexual persons, cessation of all compulsory medical action to alter the sexual orientation of adults, and equal child custody rights for homosexual parents. 169 Finally, the Assembly sought "to
assure the equality of treatment, no more no less, for homosexuals with
regard to employment, pay and job security."' 170
These two pertinent declarations, adopted by the Assembly and
based on the report of the Committee on Social and ]Health Questions, 171
strive to achieve the recognition of homosexual persons as a legitimate
minority group deserving of the state's protection rather than its moral
stigmatization.' 72 While these declarations offer more to homosexual
persons than do the decisions in the Case of X and Dudgeon 1, one
would not be possible without the other. Certainly, a criminal's social
and political rights do not merit the high degree of protection advocated
by Recommendation 924. More importantly, it is difficult to imagine the
state striving to create social equality for those it stigmatizes with criminal sanctions. On the other hand, the fact that both resolutions are qualified by the language of the Case of X and Dudgeon II decisions is
inescapable.
The Article 8 right of privacy is not the legal rationale for achieving
the goals of the declarations. This is exemplified by the Case of X and
Dudgeon II. It will take much more for the Convention or the Council of
Europe to achieve fair and just treatment for homosexual persons by the
member states. Most importantly, the Court and Commission must discredit the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral and show it
to be the anachronistic "survival of centuries of prejudice" that it is.
Once the emotional reactionism is cleared away, it is readily apparent
that homosexuals, although little known and barely understood, are
merely another minority group adding to the richness and diversity of a
pluralistic society.
II. RECOGNITION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS
A.

The Right of Privacy Is Fundamentally Flawed.

The right of privacy rationale is not useful in achieving legal equality for homosexual persons. Although this notion was the basis on which
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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the law banning adult consensual homosexual acts was struck down in
Dudgeon II, it has only limited usefulness for achieving the admirable
objectives (Le., true equality) of the Assembly's recommendation on discrimination against homosexual persons. The right of privacy rationale
is ultimately inimical to the Assembly's declarations. Sole reliance on
the right of privacy rationale serves to perpetuate the notion that homosexuality is inherently immoral because it does not call into question the
factors underlying antihomosexual sentiment; it merely circumscribes the
action that the state may take in protecting societal morals. While the
Dudgeon II decision discredited the notion that the state can absolutely
ban all adult consensual homosexual acts, it did little to further the
equality of treatment of homosexual persons under the law because it is
based on the premise that homosexuality is inherently immoral. The
Court accepted the legal dichotomy between heterosexuals and male
homosexuals regarding the age of consent. It is true that the Court relied
on the protection of the rights of others in reaching its decision, but only
after explaining that this justification was truly premised on the protection of morals. 173 There is no perceivable logical basis for this distinction. The dichotomy is merely a manifestation of the idea that
homosexuality is immoral.
Use of the right of privacy to achieve equality of treatment for homosexual persons reinforces the notion that homosexuality is immoral.
Adults can consent to remove the state's moral protection by invoking
the right of privacy. Young homosexual persons cannot, however, consent to remove the state's moral protection and are subject to the
criminalization of their sexuality. Hence, sole reliance on the right of
privacy, as used by the Dudgeon II Court, actually serves to obstruct the
goal of equal treatment under the law for homosexual persons.174
The right of privacy looks only to one manifestation of intolerance
without addressing the root of that prejudice. In analyzing whether the
laws challenged in Dudgeon II constituted a breach of the right of privacy, the Court weighed the state's interest in protecting society against
the individual's privacy interests to determine if it was sufficient to allow
an absolute ban on adult consensual homosexual relations."7 5 The Court
173. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Dudgeon II), 45 Eur. CL IL1L (ser. A) 20 (1982).
174. In considering the criminalization of homosexual expression, one United States court

has noted, "[a]fter all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class criminal." Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (homosexual persons cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class under
the equal protection clause because states may constitutionally criminalize the conduct that
defines homosexual persons as a class). Id. at 98.
175. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20.
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concluded that the state's interest could not outweigh the privacy interests of adult male homosexuals in having a legalized form of sexual expression. It nevertheless went on to rule that the state's interest did
outweigh the privacy interests of males under the age of 21.176 The compelling state interest was deemed to be the protection of those males from
the immorality of homosexual relations. 177 So while the right of privacy
serves to limit the degree of state interference with sexual expression, it
accepts that some degree of interference is warranted because of the perceived immorality of homosexuality. The right of privacy does not question the "survival of several centuries of prejudice" underlying the social
and moral reprobation of homosexuality.17 8 Assembly Recommendation
924, calling for legal equality for homosexual persons is a hollow declaration as long as the law does not challenge the basic assumption underlying antihomosexual animus-that homosexuality is inherently immoral.
1. The Morality Issue
Under the right of privacy rationale, homosexuality is still viewed as
immoral. The law does not even question the assumption. As long as
homosexuality is viewed as immoral, the elimination of discrimination
and oppression sought in the Assembly declarations is impossible.
a. The idea that homosexuality is immoral is a longheld belief
with no mnodern basis in logic
Homosexuality is not inherently immoral, it is inherently misunderstood and feared. This misunderstanding and fear gravitate together to
create a strong aversion and hostility towards homosexual persons. Combined with the ever present element of social conservatism, these are
strong forces against which those seeking the legal protection of homosexual persons as a minority group must battle. The Assembly's declarations acknowledge these forces and, in terms that are nonthreatening
seek the advancement of homosexual persons as a minority group.
Essential to understanding that homosexuality is not immoral is the
realization that modem religious educators, philosophers, and theologians are in accord in rejecting the interpretations of both old and new
Biblical passages which condemn homosexuality. 179 This perspective is,
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Application No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports, 53-56
(1975).
179. See E. GIBSON, GET OFF MY SHIP: ENSIGN BERG VS. TIle U.S. NAVY app. B, Affadavits of Support (1978). The Religious Right in the United States has not acknowledged
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of course, not universal. Certainly it has not yet filtered down to the

grass roots level. Nonetheless, it is a meaningful force which must be
reckoned with by those who advance the ungodliness of homosexuality.
Similarly, the arguments that homosexuals commit sex crimes

(other than adult consensual sodomy when proscribed) or are a sexual
threat to either minors or the mentally infirm, have been discredited in

the Dudgeon II decision.180 The Court's acceptance of these facts discredits the idea that homosexuality is inherently immoral.
b.

The immorality notion ismerely public opinion

The "immorality" of homosexuality is really nothing more than uninformed public opinion. The Court, the Assembly, and most others rec-

ognize that the assumed immorality of homosexuality is truly just the
guise in which people parade and propound their intolerance and igno-

rance regarding homosexual persons."" 1 It has been established that once
people who vehemently object to homosexuality on moral and religious
grounds become acquainted with a homosexual person, or discover that a
family member or friend is a homosexual person, they significantly
change their antihomosexual feelings.18 2 Furthermore, both the Court

and Commission recognize the fact that the decriminalization of homosexual relations has not led to a decline in the moral standards of societies affecting such change.1 8 3 Together these facts vitiate the argument

for criminalizing and stigmatizing homosexuality because of its inherent
this development in religious interpretations. It is one of the strongest forces of social conservatism in this country and opposes individual liberties on all fronts. Arguably the Religious
Right opposes the advancement of individual liberties because these liberties "threaten" the
ideological framework of this movement, and hence lessen its political and economic strength.
180. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Dudgeon II), 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 24 (1982);
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7525/76 (Dudgeon I), Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1,
35-36 (1980).
181. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 24. Indeed, one United States Court of
Appeals has recognized that the perceived immorality of homosexuality is "no more than the
prevailing mores of our society." Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(quoting a letter from John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission,
to the Mattac Society of Washington, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 3).
182. See Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia: ToRard a Practical Theory, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 923, 930 (1986). Dr. Herek posits that this change in attitude is less likely to occur in individuals whose anti-homosexual animus is motivated by "defensive attitudes," Le., an individual's repression of perceived homosexual tendencies. Id. at
931-32. Significantly, this motivation leads to the most violent and rigid anti-homosexual sentiment. Id.
183. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24; Dudgeon 1, Application No. 7525/76,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 35-36.
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The submissions by the parties in Dudgeon I expose the true nature
of the immorality argument. The British government, after the suspension of Home Rule in Northern Ireland, had considered passing a law to
decriminalize adult consensual homosexual relations. Due to the vocal
opposition of conservative forces and despite the fact that social authorities and service agencies supported the reform, the government declined
to introduce it in Parliament. 185 The Commission acknowledged the argument behind the government's rationale for failing to reform the law
by stating that "a substantial section of Northern Irish society favours
[sic] the maintenance in force of the current legislation and is opposed to
the proposed reform. The Commission accepts that this opposition is
based largely on religious and moral considerations." 86 To its credit,
the Commission held that "[i]t would be quite contrary [to the right to
respect for private life] to interpret Art. 8(2) as allowing a majority an
unqualified right to impose its standards of private sexual morality on the
whole of society." ' 7 The Commission made this statement in the narrow context of considering whether the challenged law was necessary for
the protection of morals. This principle, if applied in the context of all
arbitrary legislation or acts of discrimination affecting homosexual persons, could be the basis on which to achieve the basic human dignity due
all homosexual persons. Simply put, homosexual persons can neither be
stripped of their human dignity, nor of their political and civil rights
because of the majority's concepts of sexual morality.
c.

Use of the right of privacy reinforces the belief that
homosexuality is immoral

It is now established that the idea that homosexuality is somehow
immoral is groundless and that its force comes not from the principles
underlying that idea, but from the fact that it is accepted public opinion.
It is clear that this debilitating notion must be eliminated. As long as
homosexuality is seen as immoral, state criminalization and stigmatization of homosexuality will be sanctioned. Indeed it will be seen as a necessity. The idea that homosexuality is immoral is the major stumbling
block to achieving the goals of Assembly Recommendation 924. By allowing state interference with the sexual expression of homosexual per184. Dudgeon I1, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24; Dudgeon 1, Application No. 7525/76,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 35-36.
185. Dudgeon I, Application No. 7525/76, Eur. Comm'n H.R, at 35-36.
186. Id. at 35.
187. Id.
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sons to any degree greater than that permitted with heterosexual persons,
homosexuality is necessarily assumed to be something from which the
state must "protect" society. When homosexuality is so viewed, it precludes equality of treatment under the law for homosexual persons.
These people are somehow less than similarly situated heterosexual persons. This idea is clearly manifest in the protection of adolescents rationale. The Court and Commission have relied upon this reasoning to
uphold the legal dichotomy in the ages of consent between heterosexual
and homosexual persons.
2.

The Protection of Adolescents

The Court and Commission have been firm in their conviction that
adolescents, particularly those between the ages of 18 and 21, need protection from the influence of an "undesirable kind." 88 These laws which
ostensibly protect adolescents, actually discriminate against young homosexual persons in that they criminalize their sexual development while
stigmatizing their search for identity.
a. State coercion of sexuality
This Note does not advocate pederasty. Sexual abuse of children is
an abhorrent evil that a penal code should properly seek to punish. This
justification, however, does not substantiate significantly higher ages of
consent for homosexual persons. This is particularly true when state authorities admit the purpose behind such laws is to coerce, by means of
criminal sanctions, the development of "heterosexual tendencies" in
young homosexual persons. 89 This premise can be likened to the longdiscredited attempts to force left-handed people to utilize their right
hands. It serves only to blindly imitate the majority and to create a great
dissonance in the individual. Further, these laws directly contravene Assembly Recommendation 924 and its admonition to member states to
equalize the age of consent between heterosexual and homosexual
persons. 190
b.

The 'protection" notion is irrationaland discriminatory

The depth of the belief that adolescents must be "protected" from
developing into what they innately are has been manifested by the delib188. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 77

(1980).
189. Application No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 1, 54 (1975).
190. Assembly Recommendation 924, supra note 164, at 138.
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erations of the British Criminal Law Revision Committee. In 1980 the
British considered, but then declined to recommend lowering the age of
consent for homosexual relations. The British Committee could not
reach a consensus on a lower age but settled on age 18 rather than age 16
in order to "protect these young men between 16 and 18 whose sexual
orientation has not yet become firmly settled ... ,,19 At the same time,
it was content to consider decriminalizing incest between father and
daughter and establishing the legal age of consent at 18.192 Certainly the
implications of legalized incest, with an age of consent lower than that
for homosexual persons, perpetuates an ugly disparity in legal treatment
of homosexual persons. 193 The committee acknowledged the "genetic
risks" of incest. Further, it cannot be disputed that the power a father
can hold over a daughter adds a questionable element to any notion of
true consent. This debate illustrates that even when progressive elements
consider legislation regulating homosexuality, "[p]rejudices . . . die
hard."'1 94 Sadly, the individuals that the law purports to protect are truly

harmed and alienated by that "protection." All that is "protected" is the
"survival of several centuries of prejudice" to which homosexual persons
have been subjected.
c. The Court's and Commission'sfindings do not support the
rationale underlying the 'protection" argument
The Commission recognized that the decriminalization of homosexual relations has not contributed to an appreciable rise in the number of
homosexuals within that society.' 95 Indeed, decriminalization only accomplishes the integration of homosexual persons into society by initiating the first step toward the recognition of homosexual persons as a
legitimate minority group. In the Assembly's words, decriminalization
"assure[s] equality of treatment, no more no less, for homosexuals
... ." 196 This goal is fully compatible with the protection of adolescents,
from both a moral perspective and under the notion of the protection of
the rights of others.
By equalizing the age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual
191. Sexually Offensive? 130 NEW L.J. 1054 (1980); see Hindley, The Age of Consentfor
Male Homosexuals, 1986 CRIM. L. REv. 595.
192. Sexually Offensive?, supra note 191, at 1054.
193. Cf maintaining age 21 as the age of consent for homosexual relations. See supra text
accompanying note 175.
194. Id.; see also Hindley, supra note 191, at 598.
195. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 3525/76 ()udgeon 1), Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 1, 35 (1980).

196. Assembly Recommendation 924, supra note 164, at 138.
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persons, the state can create an environment in which adolescents can
develop free of moral, social, and legal reprobation.1 97 The fact that the
decriminalization of homosexual acts does not increase the number of
homosexual persons in a society supports the proposition that homosexual persons are homosexual regardless of society's notions of sexual propriety. When the law works to alienate and stigmatize individuals as
they develop into adults and full members of society, these individuals
are harmed far more drastically than they would be by merely allowing
them to develop into adults free of these moral, social, and legal
recriminations. 198
3.

The Right of Privacy Is Theoretically Flawed as a Vehicle
for Achieving Equality Under the Law for
Homosexual Persons

The right of privacy is theoretically flawed as the legal doctrine on
which homosexual persons can base their struggle for equality under the
law. The right of privacy limits the degree of state interference with homosexual persons' privacy. It does not, however, provide the legal
framework on which to eliminate that interference. Thus far, the Court
and Commission have not questioned the soundness of the reasons purporting to justify state interference. Instead, they have merely weighed
and balanced these reasons with the privacy interests of homosexual persons.19 9 In performing the right of privacy analysis, the Court and Commission are not forced to pierce the veil of "several centuries of
prejudice" which underlies the state's reasons purporting to justify the
differential treatment of heterosexual and homosexual persons.
Furthermore, the right of privacy is a fluid, individual right. The
definition of privacy under the Convention has been the subject of much
debate.2 ' ° Certainly, the time may come when privacy is not seen as
encompassing the right to engage in adult consensual homosexual relations.2 0 1 Because the right of privacy is an individual right, at least one
197. See Hindley, supra note 191, at 602-03.
198. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.L 1, 18-19 (1980). The applicant, in the Case ofX, cited to the 1969 report of the Speijer Committee, charged with studying
the laws relating to homosexuality in the Netherlands, which found that "homosexual contacts
could often be of positive help to the young person with homosexual tendencies in so far as
they might reduce or even eliminate sensations of stress and frustration." Id. The Speijer
Committee found that there was no real possibility that one could be "converted" to homosexuality through seduction after the age 16, because one's sexual orientation is firmly established
by that age. Hindley, supra note 187, at 601.
199. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Dudgeon II), 45 Eur. Ct. H.RL (ser. A) 18 (1982).
200. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 8, at 287.
201. For instance, in the United States homosexual persons do not enjoy the right of pri-
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member of the Commission questions whether the right of privacy affords any protection of homosexual relations between two persons. 2 2
The legal protection afforded homosexual persons through the right of
privacy is tenuous, at best.20 3
The right of privacy has served a very helpful and necessary function under the Convention by supplying the basis on which to overturn
laws criminalizing adult consensual homosexual relations. The rule
under the right of privacy is, however, problematic. It argues that even
though some members of society may consider homosexual relations immoral (or at least of questionable moral propriety), the state cannot interfere with consenting adults engaging in such relations. 2°4 The right of
privacy must now be abandoned and a new premise found upon which to
achieve equal treatment under the law for homosexual persons. The potential for achieving this exists under the Convention. That potential
must now be tapped in order to implement Assembly Recommendation
924.
III.

SEXUAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS A
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM

In order to eradicate the "survival of several centuries of prejudice"
against homosexual persons, the state must recognize that homosexual
persons are indeed equal to heterosexual persons under the law. This
equality is not possible when homosexuality is viewed as immoral, and a
force against which people must be protected. Instead, the Convention
must recognize sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom.
Each individual may live his or her sexuality free of state interference or
coercion. Indeed, this is a basic premise of democracy.20 5 The Court has
acknowledged this idea in stating that democratic societies embody "two
hallmarks... tolerance and broadmindedness ....,206
A.

Fundamental Freedoms Are the Cornerstone of
Democratic Systems
Democratic systems of government seek to establish a social order

vacy as to their sexual expression. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 473 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841
(1986).
202. Case of X, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports at 81 (separate opinion of Mr.
Opsahl).
203. See infra notes 225-45 and accompanying text.
204. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24-25.
205. See infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
206. Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21.
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in which human dignity assumes its highest potential. Nevertheless, we
as participants in the democratic governing process lack comprehensive
insight into what is truly right and just. One commentator defines democracy as "a procedural attempt to reconcile our existential uncertainty
about right and justice with the need to form social structures by just
means.

2

7

This system of government presupposes that the voices of

many of its citizens are significant. The negative of this is that the
clamor of established majorities may drown out the voice of certain minorities. This was exemplified by the British government's decision not
to reform the law regarding homosexuality due to ardent and vocal conservative opposition. Fundamental freedoms serve to protect minorities
from the whims of the majority. With sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom, the majority's shock or offense at the existence of homosexuality would not suffice to proscribe it, even amongst those in the
18 to 21 age group. 0 8
The Convention recognizes the paramount importance of fundamental freedoms in a democratic system. The preamble states:
[r]eaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and
are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of
the Human Rights upon which they depend ....

The structure of Article 8 of the Convention reflects the intricate
balance of fundamental freedoms and democracy. The fundamental
right of privacy is stated in Article 8, paragraph 1. Lawful state interferences which are "necessary in a democratic society" are a limitation on
that right of privacy.2 10 Democratic systems of government are constantly evolving in an effort to achieve the highest potential for human
dignity and the concomitant recognition of individual liberties. This
evolution is seen in the Commission's change in position on applications
challenging the criminalization of homosexuality since 1955. Democracies must now recognize sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom in order to reach their underlying goal of achieving basic human

dignity.
Sexual self-determination can be a misleading term. It is not meant
to imply that individuals select their sexuality from a choice of options.
207. Muller, FundamentalRights in Democracy, 4 HuM. RTs. LJ.131 (1983).
208. See Dudgeon II, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 24.
209. Convention, supra note 2, at 222.
210. Id. at 230.
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Rather, the individual can manifest his or her innate sexuality without
the interference of the state.211 This is what Assembly Recommendation
924 acknowledges, and the term is borrowed from that declaration. 212
Sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom may seem outlandish at first. It is, however, well-founded on both the notions of individual liberty and, more significantly, basic human dignity. The
stigmatization of the homosexual individual by the criminalization of his
sexual expression is only a small measure of the harm and alienation that
he feels at the hands of society. The Commission and the Court have
now removed this criminal stigma for adults. It still exists, however, for
those adolescents who reside in states that have higher ages of sexual
consent for homosexual persons. More is affected than mere sexual expression. The Assembly succinctly stated it in Recommendation 924,
"homosexuals ... continue to suffer from discrimination and even, at
times, from oppression .... ,213 The arbitrarily higher age of consent for

homosexual persons is a prime example of this discrimination and oppression. While establishing sexual self-determination as a fundamental
freedom will not alter societal and religious prejudices against homosexual persons, it will be a first step. More importantly, it can provide a
means by which those homosexual persons who are victims of such discrimination can seek legal redress. Recognition of sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom could establish the equality of
homosexual persons under the law. This equality would prevent state
discrimination against homosexual persons and begin the long process of
encouraging societal acceptance of homosexual persons.
B.

Protection of Homosexual Persons as a Class

The twin evils of prejudice and ignorance are the foundation of antihomosexual sentiment. The Case of X illustrates their pervasive influence. The British government argued that a higher age of consent for
homosexual adolescents was necessary in order to protect these men
from the attentions of an "undesirable kind."2 4 The Commission accepted the British government's justification of protecting the health and
morals of adolescents between the ages of 18 and 21 by criminalizing
211. See Application No. 704/60, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Collection of Decisions 1, 136
(1960) (the Commission declined to consider a challenge to the criminalization of homosexuality based on the fact that homosexual persons are innately homoseKual. As such, homosexual
persons should not be held criminally liable for the sexual expression of their innate sexuality),
212. Assembly Recommendation 924, supra note 164.
213. Id.
214. Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 25-26 (1980).
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their sexual expression. Yet, nowhere in the decision is there a definition
of "undesirable kind."2' 15 It was merely accepted that homosexuality itself was undesirable. This rationale was accepted as sufficient to inflict
the stigma of criminality and the ensuing psychological pain and social
alienation on these adolescents. The adolescents whose development is
stunted under this regime, will inevitably embody what could be portrayed as antisocial or possibly even immoral behavior.21 6 These adolescents will then be the examples for those who decry the immorality of
homosexuality. The cycle of prejudice is self-perpetuating. Only the intervention of the state can stop the cycle. Sexual self-determination as a
fundamental freedom is the means by which this state intervention can be
ensured.
Antihomosexual sentiment is no different from racism or anti-Semitism. It is a manifestation of fear and ignorance. This simple fact is
often lost upon people because this prejudice has the weighty rhetoric of
religion and morality ostensibly behind it. As discussed above, the religious and moral considerations that are used to bolster antihomosexual
laws and sentiments are groundless. The words and arguments that vitiate the religious and moral objections to homosexuality, however, often
fall upon deaf ears. Homosexual persons by their very nature are limited
in fighting the social and moral reprobation. This is because homosexual
persons represent a challenge to society's basic beliefs.21 7 One whose
very existence challenges those basic beliefs is not in the most credible
position to sway the believers. It requires more. It requires the intervention and the protection of the state.
The protection of the state, however, may still not overcome strong
public opinion. One need only look to the plight of Blacks in the United
States. After more than one hundred years of freedom from slavery and
extensive legislative efforts to protect their rights, Blacks still suffer from
the effects of racism. The racist can always cite facts to support the stereotypes by looking to those elements of Black America that are the most
215. Id.
216. See Hindley, supra note 191, at 603.
217. Herek, supra note 182 and accompanying text. The existence of homosexual persons
challenges very fundamental notions of traditional family life, the idea that "for every boy
there's a girl," and the value of procreation (particularly in relation to lesbians). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently recognized the political powerlessness of
homosexual persons, due in part to the fact that homosexual persons are excluded from the
mainstream of society. Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 144448 (9th Cir.),
reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexual persons cannot constitutionally be discharged from the armed services based solely on homosexual orientation, absent
evidence of homosexual conduct).
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oppressed. Yet, the racist fails to take into consideration the paralyzing
impact of that oppression which alienates and ostracizes those Blacks
from society.
The current resurgence of anti-Semitism in Western Europe is another example. People look upon this resurgence with consternation,
particularly in light of the immeasurable horror that was perpetrated by
anti-Semitism only four decades ago. There can be no logical explanation. Ignorance and irrationality control. The state cannot be a party to
this phenomenon and indeed must counteract it by any appropriate
means. Similarly, the state must take the first step toward recognizing
homosexual persons as equal under the law. Otherwise, the state sanctions and indeed fosters the "survival of several centuries of prejudice"
against homosexual persons.218
Sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom would provide
protection to homosexual persons as a class. By recognizing this freedom
the state would rid itself of its prejudice and ignorance regarding homosexual persons. If the state recognizes homosexual persons as equal
under the law, it can protect homosexual persons from the societal discrimination they face. Sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom would not affect an immediate change in societal prejudice, just as
laws banning discrimination on the basis of race and religion have not
eradicated racism or anti-Semitism. It would, however, limit the deleterious effects of societal aversion and hostility toward homosexuality. It
would guarantee "equality of treatment" under the law219 for homosexual persons and create an environment in which Assembly Recommendation 924 could take hold.
By providing protection for homosexual persons as a class, sexual
self-determination as a fundamental freedom would further the equality
of homosexual persons in a way that the right of privacy cannot. The
fundamental freedom model would protect those in the 18 to 21 age
group and those in the military. 22 0 It is antihomosexual animus that sup-

ports governmental discrimination against homosexual persons whose
privacy interests do not outweigh the state interference. This same antihomosexual animus is the source of societal discrimination against homosexual persons. In short, the state must guarantee more than free
sexual expression for homosexual persons with compelling privacy inter218. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
219. See Assembly Recommendation 924, supra note 164, at 138.
220. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
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ests. To be true to Assembly Recommendation 924, it must guarantee
that sexual self-determination is a fundamental freedom.
C.

The Structure Exists under the Convention to Implement Sexual
Self-Determination as a Fundamental Freedom

The structure already exists within the Convention upon which this
fundamental freedom could be built. Article 14 of the Convention states
in part, "[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex... or other status."'2 1 Taken in conjunction with Article 3: "[n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,"''2 2 the framework exists upon which to secure the equal
treatment under the law for homosexuals within member states.
Both the Commission and the Court have declined to extend the
Article 14 protection against discrimination based on sex to homosexual
persons.22 3 The potential for this protection exists, nonetheless, under
the "other status" category. Article 14 protection for homosexuals is not
a novel notion. It is supported in a separate dissenting opinion from the
Commission's Report in Dudgeon L 4 The dissenting member of the
Commission found a violation of Article 14 in Northern Ireland's prohibition of all homosexual relations:
[Tihe prohibition... stigmatizes homosexuality .... By doing so
the State, which has the duty to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, supports and
intensifies old and deep-seated sentiments of aversion and fear which
have been proved to be unjustifiable and without factual ground ....
By maintaining these provisions the State discriminates strongly
against this group of the population in comparision with heterosexual
adults .... This difference amounts to a clear inequality of treatment
in the enjoyment of the right in question, which is a fundamental aspect of this case.22 5
The possibility exists that the majority of the Commission declined
to find a violation of Article 14 in order to avoid extending such protec221. Convention, supra note 2, at 232 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 224.
223. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Dudgeon II), 45 Eur. Ct. H.IL (ser. A) (1982);
Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1 (1980).
224. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7525/76 (Dudgeon 1), Eur.
Comrn'n H.R. 1, 40 (1980) (separate opinion of Mr. Polak).
225. Id.
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tion to homosexual persons. It is also possible that a violation was held
in check by those "old and deep-seated sentiments of aversion and fear."
The assertion of protection under Article 3 is simple. It bans "inhuman or degrading treatment. '2 26 State sanctioned discrimination against
homosexual persons is certainly degrading. The denial of sexual expression and the stigma of criminal sanctions on homosexual adolescents between the ages of 18 and 21 is discriminatory, particularly when
heterosexuals are allowed sexual expression at a significantly earlier
age.227 State attempts to coercively alter the sexuality of its citizens
through the criminal law22 8 also constitute inhuman and degrading
treatment.
Now that the Court and the Commission have taken the laudable
step of holding that criminal laws which prohibit consensual homosexual
relations between adults are in breach of the Convention's Article 8 right
of privacy, they must take the more difficult and crucial step of affording
Article 14 protection to homosexual persons as a class. Once sexual selfdetermination is deemed a fundamental freedom, the right of privacy can
be abandoned and homosexual persons can rest secure in the protection
that the Assembly advocates in Recommendation 924. Homosexual persons as a class will then be protected, through Article 14, from arbitrary
discrimination. The state will thus disavow the "survival of several centuries of prejudice" upon which it has relied to crirainalize and stigmatize homosexual persons. By doing so, the state will be moving towards a
guarantee of equal treatment under the law for homosexual persons.
D.

The Fundamental Freedom Notion Eliminates the Anomalies of
the Right of Privacy Protection

Recognition of sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom
would permit the Commission and the Court to implement the spirit of
Assembly Recommendation 924. The right of privacy does not provide
this basis. Consider the challenge that was maintained in the Case of X.
Under the fundamental freedom rationale the impugned law that dichotomized the age of sexual consent between heterosexuals and homosexual
persons would certainly have been struck down as a violation of Article
14 in conjunction with Article 3 or Article 8. As previously shown, this
would inure to the benefit of the subject age group and to British society
as a whole.2 29
226.
227.
228.
229.

Convention, supra note 2, at 224.
See Case of X, Application No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1.
See Application No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 1, 46 (1975).
See supra note 198, and the reference therein to the Speijer Committee findings.
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Under the case law as it now stands, there is the anomaly that homosexuality is immoral yet cannot be proscribed between consenting
adults. However, the state may still regulate homosexuality by discriminating against homosexual persons under an arbitrarily prescribed age.
This system of case law furthers neither the cause of homosexual persons,
nor the Council of Europe's extensive and unparalleled efforts to eradicate discrimination, intolerance, and racism." 0 Rather, it reinforces the
idea that homosexuality is inherently immoral and the proper subject of
state regulation through criminal sanctions.
1. Post-Dudgeon Decisions Reflect the Need for Sexual SelfDetermination as a Fundamental Freedom
Two cases brought before the Commission since Dudgeon illustrate
the ineffectiveness of the right of privacy in the effort to achieve equality
under the law for homosexual persons. Application 9369/81 was declared inadmissible in 1983.231 In that case, two homosexual men, who
had been in a relationship for several years, sought to have the deportation of one of the men stayed.232 The deportee was a Malaysian citizen
who had resided in Great Britain with his partner since 1979. 2a Apparently, the deportation had nothing to do with the Malaysian's homosexuality but resulted solely from the application of British immigration laws.
The Commission refused to categorize the couple as protected by the
right to respect for family life under Article 8.11 The Commission did,
however, rule that the relationship was a matter of the applicants' private
life,235 thus necessitating an inquiry into whether the deportation order
constituted an unwarranted interference with the applicants' right of privacy.2 36 The Commission then looked to whether the deportation was an
interference with that right of privacy by analogizing to the test used to
determine whether immigration challenges constitute an interference
2 37
with family life.
It is doubtful that a different decision would have been obtained had
the Commission deemed the couple a "family" under Article 8. The inevitable question arises, however, as to whether the Commission took
230. See The Council of Europeand Its Work Against Intolerane, Discriminationand Racism, Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1982.
231. Application No. 9369/81, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Decisions & Reports 1, 220 (1983).
232. Id. at 220-21.
233. Id. at 221.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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this circuitous path merely to avoid legitimizing this homosexual relationship as family life. Hence, like earlier Commission decisions on homosexuality, the significance of this case lies not so much in the result as
in the reasoning underlying the decision. The Commission took pains to
note that the applicants had been in a "stable" homosexual relationship.23 8 One wonders how often the Commission inquires into the stability of family relationships that are protected under Article 8.
The second case to be considered was Application 9237/81.239 The
Commission also declared this application inadmissible in 1983.240 Here,
the applicant challenged his court-martial and dishonorable discharge
from the British Armed Forces on account of his homosexuality. 24 The
Commission rendered a decision reminiscent of its earlier ones which had
gratuitously upheld harsh and oppressive state sanctions against homosexual persons.
The government justified the court-martial as necessary to prevent
the disruption of order in the Armed Forces.242 The disruption that the
government invoked to justify its action, however, resulted from the government's own acts of prosecution and persecution against the applicant.
The government then elaborated on the security risk of homosexual per24 3
sons in the armed services because they are so vulnerable to blackmail,
This argument, too, is utterly self-serving. Homosexual persons in the
military are so vulnerable to blackmail because of the ruthless and vindictive treatment they receive at the hands of military authorities should
their sexual orientation be exposed. Lastly, the government argued that
homosexuals cannot be permitted in the military because they might use
244
their rank to coerce sexual relations from those under their command.
This sophistry is difficult to countenance from the same country that
considered decriminalizing incest between fathers and consenting daughters over the age of 18.245 Regardless, the Commission concluded that
forced sexual acts are better deterred by the discriminatory exclusion of
an entire class of persons, rather than harsh criminal sanctions.
The Commission found that the court-martial did interfere with the
applicant's right of privacy under Article 8.246 Since homosexuality
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Application No. 9237/81, 34 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 68 (1983).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.

243. Id.
244. Id.

245. See Sexually Offensive?, supra note 191, at 1054.
246. See Application 9237/81, 34 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 71.
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could be regulated for the protection of morals under the Dudgeon I decision, and the morality factor coupled with the military justifications were
so compelling in the government's case, the interference was warranted
under paragraph 2 of Article 8.247 The applicant had also alleged a violation under Article 14. The Commission once again refused to address
this complaint since it had deemed the interference necessary in a democratic society under Article 8.241
2.

Opposite Results Would Have Occurred if Sexual SelfDetermination Were a Fundamental Freedom

These two cases would have been decided differently if sexual selfdetermination were a fundamental freedom. First, the Commission
would not have had to perform the mental gymnastics in the deportation
case to avoid the appearance of legitimizing the homosexual relationship
by classifying it as family life under Article 8. One can take solace in the
fact that the relationship was, at least, treated as family life. If the relationship had not been deemed "stable," an entirely different result might
have been obtained. The Commission clearly was not acting within the
spirit of Assembly Recommendation 924. The decision on the military
application is particularly disturbing. When sexual self-determination is
recognized as a fundamental freedom, governments will not be permitted
such latitude in acting upon antihomosexual prejudice. At a minimum, a
government would be compelled to adduce substantial, non-circular, and
specific reasons to justify such harsh and vindictive action. The Commission acted in complete contravention of the spirit and letter of Assembly
Recommendation 924.249 Although the Commission is not bound by the
Recommendation, there can be no hope for an improvement in societal
attitudes towards homosexual persons when states themselves are still so
steeped in the "survival of several centuries of prejudice."
3.

The Commission Is Looking Backward

In these two most recent decisions, the Commission seemed to look
backward rather than forward to establish its perspective on homosexuality. Ironically, the decision in Application 9237/81, the military case,
quoted extensively from Dudgeon L It is hoped that this does not antici247. Id. at 71-72.
248. Id. at 72.
249. Assembly Recommendation 924, supra note 164. The Recommendation states that

the Assembly calls upon the governments of member states "to assure equality of treatment,
no more no less, for homosexuals with regard to employment, pay and job security, particularly in the public sector." Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
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pate future decisions that rely on the darker side of Dudgeon I in unquestionably assuming homosexuality is malum in se. Since neither the
Commission nor the Court is bound by precedent, the inroad made by
Dudgeon I may soon be lost to the notions underlying Application 9237/
81. In light of these more recent decisions, it is imperative that sexual
self-determination be a fundamental freedom. Without this guarantee,
the seed of progress made under Dudgeon I may wither and die. The
fundamental freedom notion is essential both to protect the precedence of
Dudgeon I and to begin the long trek down the road toward eliminating
the overarching and fallacious belief that homosexuality is inherently immoral, thereby inching toward equal treatment under the law for homosexual persons.
E. The Fundamental Freedom Notion Provides a Model for All
Democratic Systems
Just as the Dudgeon I decision was a major step forward, the Convention, through Recommendation 924 and Article 14, can lead democratic nations in guaranteeing equal treatment for all under the law. This
eminence will not come from the Dudgeon I decision alone, but from
utilizing the potential that exists under the Convention to establish sexual self-determination as a fundamental freedom. The Assembly declarations serve as an impetus to fulfill this potential. The Convention and its
organs are leaders in the field of human rights. More than a few constitutions are modeled on the Convention.250 Moreover, the Convention is
profoundly committed to the abolition of all forms of discrimination. 251
The Convention cannot be a world leader in the field of human rights if it
permits prejudice to flourish in any form, regardless of the reasons purporting to support that prejudice.
The democratic system of government has survived a multitude of
assaults in Western Europe. The Convention represents Western Europe's deep commitment to democracy. In keeping with this position,
the Convention has established an unprecedented enforcement mechanism to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. This mechanism is a hollow guarantee when it is unavailable to minority groups.
The mechanism is not a model when it operates selectively or becomes
stalled by the "survival of several centuries of prejudice." Therefore, the
Court and Commission must now look to Article 14 and Assembly Rec250. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 8,at 283.
251. See Convention, supra note 2.
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ommendation 924 to guarantee the human rights of homosexual persons
under the Convention.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There has been a constant evolution of opinion in the Commission
regarding the criminalization of homosexual relations. In the thirty
years since its creation, it has come full circle; from acquiescing to any
form of criminalization in the first twenty years, to finding a breach
under the Convention in Northern Ireland's absolute ban on all homosexual relations in 1982. The Court, too, has played a role in its
landmark decision upholding the Commission in Dudgeon I. In this
change of position for homosexual persons under the Convention, there
has been a major step forward in the advancement of human rights.
Their position, however, is not secure in Dudgeon IL As already noted,
the Court and Commission are not bound by precedent." 2 This worked
to the advantage of homosexual persons in Dudgeon II. The prospect for
any further advancement of human rights with respect to homosexual
persons under the Convention is, however, by no means assured. Both
the Court and Commission still operate on the assumption that there is
some implicit immorality in homosexuality. Accordingly, they are limited by their own prejudice rather than by the far-reaching bounds of the
Convention in considering challenges to state regulation and stigmatization of homosexuality.
The right of privacy has served a helpful, albeit limited, purpose in
providing the rationale on which the Court and Commission could premise their rulings in Dudgeon II. Reliance on the right of privacy is, however, at best problematic. The right of privacy does nothing to challenge
the organs under the Convention to look beyond their own prejudices in
assessing the position of homosexual persons under the Convention.
Moreover, it serves to subtly reinforce the notion that homosexuality is
inherently immoral. This meritless notion cannot be ensconced in Convention case law when the Convention conversely seeks to abolish all
forms of discrimination, especially since this notion is nothing more than
the "survival of several centuries of prejudice."
The tools do exist, however, with which this monolith of antihomosexual sentiment can be eroded. The Assembly declarations are
the most potent. These declarations acknowledge the plight of the homosexual person in modem society and call for state intervention to redress
that plight. The Convention has the framework upon which this protec252. See supra note 12, and accompanying text.
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tion can be built. Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 provides the
rule that homosexual persons cannot be treated inhumanly or degradingly in the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms of the Convention.
Under this rule, sexual self-determination is a fundamental freedom. The
rule also allows the first step towards eliminating societal prejudice
against homosexual persons to be taken. The catalyst to this step must
be the Court and the Commission. The decisions since Dudgeon II are
not encouraging in this regard. It is hoped that these later decisions will
someday be nothing more than slight aberrations in the course of the
advancement of human fights for homosexual persons under the Convention. The fights guaranteed under the Convention, and the enforcement mechanism used to insure them, are unprecedented. The Council
of Europe's work towards the abolition of discrimination and intolerance
are unparalleled. It is, therefore, the institution on which homosexual
persons can place their hope for the realization of equal treatment under
the law.

